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ABSTRACT

This study examined how closely 11 accepted principles for managing budgets were followed at 98 public college campuses during the first half of the 1990s, a period of budget problems. The colleges reviewed were in six states: California, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. The study found that (1) planning was not inclusive, since faculty and students were underrepresented; (2) few institutions had both long- and short-term budget plans; (3) most campuses relied primarily on selective cuts, although a strong minority allocated cuts across the board; (4) criteria for cuts reflected ease and availability rather than quality or priority; (5) expenditure reductions exceeded revenue increases on most campuses, but tuition and fee increases restricted access in several states; (6) although most institutions favored short-term personnel strategies, a strong minority included layoffs and retrenchments; (7) most campuses acted to raise productivity and performance in administration and management but avoided academic areas; (8) most campuses did not eliminate academic programs to improve quality and efficiency; (9) most campuses limited restructuring of offices and activities to administrative functions; (10) few campuses refocused their missions based on institutional strengths and student demands; and (11) most campuses did protect quality and access in undergraduate education, but a large minority conceded that both had declined. Detailed tables are appended. (DB)

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

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CONTENTS

Managing Campus Budgets in Trying Times: Did Practices Follow Principles?[1]

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§ Introduction

By the early 1990s, the drumbeat of restructuring rolling through the corporate world echoed on public campuses. Critics claimed that campuses suffered from similar ills to those plaguing corporations. Colleges and universities reeled from rising costs and competition, falling productivity and performance, and diminished resources and results. The remedy of restructuring then reshaping American industry, they argued, should also remake public campuses. Public accountability would become the campus equivalent of corporate profits. By the early 1990s, public colleges and universities in many states appeared to have no choice. The historic declines in accustomed state support seem to demand drastic measures and fundamental changes.[2]

Commentators predicted that trying times would force restructuring on public campuses. "The 1990s promise to be a time of wrenching transition for American colleges and universities," said the *Christian Science Monitor* in 1992. ". . . With budgets declining and criticism rising, many universities. . . find they may have to make sweeping changes to stay in business."[3] Clark Kerr — the architect of the California master plan — declared that "these few years of the middle '90s will be a defining moment in the history of higher education."[4] Although he spoke of California, he could have been talking about public higher education in many states. In 1993, Edward Hines, editor of *State Higher Education Appropriations*, saw bleak budgets leading to "the beginning of a fundamental reshaping of higher education. . . ."[5] Elaine El-Khawas in *Campus Trends 1994* claimed that "reorganization and redirection may be the defining themes of the 1990s for American higher education."[6] Restructuring and reengineering — the management strategies that had made the elephants of industry dance — would, it seemed, transform the animals of academe.

§ Budget Principles and Practices

The choices for public campuses seemed clear. The problems demanded fundamental not incremental changes, collaborative not hierarchical planning, long- not short-term strategies, curtailed

1 The Henry Luce Foundation generously supported the research on how colleges and universities and university systems dealt with the budget problems of the 1990s. For the experience of systems, see Joseph C. Burke, "Multi-Campus Systems: The Challenge of the Nineties," in Jerry Gaither (ed.), *The Multicampus System*. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 1998.

2 Edward Hines, *State Higher Education 1990-91 through 1995-96*. Denver: State Higher Education Executive Officers, 1991-1996.

3 December 16, 1992.

4 California Postsecondary Education Commission, Report 93-21, October 1993.

5 *Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 21, 1993, A21.

6 American Council of Higher Education, Washington, DC, 1994

not comprehensive missions, and client- not provider-driven decisions. The following prescription for managing budgets in trying times contains 11 principles that seem almost truisms. They constitute a consensus in the literature of how public campuses should deal with budget problems:[7]

1. Implement an inclusive and collaborative planning process;
2. Develop long-term as well as short-term budget plans;
3. Cut selectively, not across-the-board;
4. Make expenditure reductions exceed revenue increases to avoid excessive tuition and fee increases;
5. Use quality and priority, not equity and ease, as the criteria for cuts;
6. Base personnel decisions on long-term, not short-term, strategies;
7. Raise both productivity and performance in all areas, including instruction;
8. Reduce the number of degree programs to improve quality and efficiency;
9. Restructure offices and activities to reduce costs and improve performance;
10. Refocus campus missions on institutional strengths and student demands;
11. Protect both the quality of, and access to, undergraduate education.

These principles sought both quality and efficiency. They prescribed doing better with less, rather than just doing less or even more with less. Gordon Davies, then director of the State Council of Higher Education in Virginia, urged "restructuring of a long-term nature, as distinct from belt-tightening."[8] The "Criteria for Restructuring" adopted by the Council of Higher Education in Virginia asked its colleges and universities, whether they restructured faculty roles, institutional missions, campus curricula, administrative organizations, and internal governance.[9]

All leaders — but not most critics — know that prescribing principles in theory is always easier than pursuing them in practice. As Socrates said: Knowing and doing are two quite different acts. Campus cultures and state politics play havoc with budgeting principles. A campus leader who tried to implement all of these principles — especially all at once — would not remain a leader for long. Drastic actions, especially on budgets, often alienate the campus community and destroy the ability to lead. Just as often, such actions lose support in state capitols. Governors and legislators demand strong leadership of public colleges and universities, but usually on the impossible condition that drastic decisions come quietly with muted opposition. For campus leaders, like comedians, timing is critical. Knowing when to push for controversial actions and when to placate the opposition is crucial. Drastic changes do disrupt colleges and universities, diverting attention from the primary purposes of teaching and learning and research and service. When controversy covers a campus, little of the real work gets done.

The principles themselves also create problems. Nearly all of them are controversial. Some seem contradictory, while several require judgments, which is always debatable, especially on campus. Cutting selectively, dropping programs, refocusing missions, raising productivity and performance,

7 See, for example, The State Council of Higher Education Virginia, *Restructuring Criteria*. Richmond, VA: SCHEV, 1994; Education Commission of the States, Policy Papers on Higher Education, *Restructuring Colleges and Universities: The Challenges and Consequences*, 1996; David W. Leslie and E. K. Fretwell, *Wise Moves in Hard Times: Creating & Managing Colleges & Universities*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996. George Keller, *Academic Strategy: The Management Revolution in Higher Education*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Barbara Uehling, "So Money is a Problem," *Journal for Higher Education Management* 7, Winter-Spring 1992, pp. 7-13.

8 Editors of *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, *The Almanac of Higher Education 1995*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 292

9 SCHEV, Restructuring Criteria.

and restructuring offices and operations inevitably create controversy. The status quo always has entrenched supporters, and even opponents have learned to live with it. Participants in most organizations naturally prefer certainty to change. In addition, the call for inclusive and collaborative planning appears incompatible with producing controversial plans, which always have losers as well as winners. In the planning process, potential losers are always vocal, while obvious winners are usually silent. The complexity of colleges and universities also complicates planning. Their multiple purposes often produce conflicting goals. Maintaining undergraduate access can erode academic quality; and raising productivity and performance offer objectives that can conflict. Deciding which programs exhibit quality and require priority represent judgment calls that opponents can and will dispute.

Circumstances, whether they arise on college campuses or in state capitals, do call for caution or accommodation, but these conditions do not deny the validity or the necessity of the budgeting principles. These principles state what should be done, though they never determine when, how, and — at times — whether they should be implemented. Practice should soften the application of principles, but principles must stiffen practice.Practices represent tactical decisions, while principles involve strategic considerations. The easy way for leaders in most organizations is to go along to get along. But the easy way is seldom the best way for real leaders. Leaders must be seen as principled as well as flexible. Leaders without the courage and convictions to make principled decisions have few followers in the long run. Leaders should never be hard headed in adhering to principles whatever the circumstances, but they should be tough minded in insisting on them whenever necessary.

Leaders learn all too quickly how to survive, but the best realize in time that survival is not synonymous with success. Long-term success depends on their willingness to make difficult decisions and debatable judgements, such as cutting programs and budgets selectively based on their best estimates of quality and priorities. Collaborative planning incorporating diverse constituencies and interests obviously presents problemsin developing plans that benefit the campus as a whole but not each of its parts. Despite this difficulty, campus commitment, or at least acquiescence, is impossible without wide participation. No leader should court controversy. Popularity is desirable but never at the price of avoiding actions that are essential to success. The true test of leaders is not the length of their tenure but the impact of their actions. And the impact of their actions, and often the length of their tenure, depends not on their momentary popularity but their long-term effect.

With all their qualifications and problems, the principles offer a test of good planning and budgeting. These principles should shape — but not dictate — budgeting practices in public colleges and universities, especially in trying times. If there ever was a time for tough and principled decisions for many, perhaps most, campuses, it surely came in the first half of the 1990s. Still campuses can not act alone. Such times also suggested that states should revise the factors that determined their allocations to campuses. They should reduce the emphasis on input measures such as base budgets, enrollments, and inflationary increases, while increasing the stress on performance and productivity.

§ The Study States

To test whether practices followed principles, the Public Higher Education Program at the Rockefeller Institute examined how public colleges and universities dealt with the budget problems in the first half of the 1990s. We surveyed the chief finance officers of public four-year colleges and universities in six states: California, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. Although institutional actions in just six states cannot stand for campus performance in all the states, these six enroll a large percent of the students in public colleges and universities. They also include the largest systems in the nation and represent the full range of system types and of doctoral and nondoctoral campuses. The six states cover major regions of the country and exhibit divergent atti-

tudes toward public higher education and different patterns of state funding. Massachusetts and New York have strong private sectors, while public institutions predominated in Florida and Texas. Institutions in these states were not necessarily the most active in responding to the fiscal problem. Other states, such as Oregon and Virginia, did more. But they do represent a large number of institutions that can give a broad picture of how public campuses across the country, with varying levels of budget problems, responded to the challenge.

State funding during the period ranged from drastic reductions in California, Massachusetts, and New York, budget constraints in Florida and Wisconsin, and curtailed increases in Texas. California, Florida, and Texas faced burgeoning enrollments, while Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin expected stable numbers or modest growth. Budget cuts for higher education hit hardest in California, Massachusetts, and New York, where annual funding in nominal dollars actually fell in several years. Florida and Wisconsin had smaller problems, though their state appropriations failed to keep pace with inflation. Public higher education in Texas escaped even inflationary cuts, but its annual growth in state funding fell below previous levels.[10] All of the states experienced anti-tax sentiments, which often produced tax cuts and constitutional limitations on spending that restricted state revenues. Competition with mandated services such as corrections, public schools, health care, and welfare meant diminished increases or deeper cuts in higher education, one of the largest discretionary items in state budgets.[11]

§ The Survey

The Public Higher Education Program sent surveys to the chief finance officers of baccalaureate campuses in these six states. We mailed the questionnaires in October 1997 and received the replies in November and December. Although the surveys went to finance officers to ensure a single knowledgeable contact, the answers from institutions required assistance from officers in academic affairs and institutional research. Discussion with a number of the respondents confirms that their replies represented collective responses, composed with input from several offices. Questionnaires went to 145 institutions and 98 replied, for a total return rate of 68 percent. By state, they ranged from a high of 90 percent in Florida to a low of 54 percent in Massachusetts and Wisconsin. The replies came from 34 doctoral and 54 nondoctoral campuses.[12] The 27 questions in the Survey tracked whether campuses followed the principles for dealing with budget problems.

§ Budget Severity

The first question asked for an assessment of the budget problem facing each institution. Very large, large, moderate, small, and none constituted the choices. We started with the natural assumption that perceptions of the budget problems would dictate institutional responses. Nearly two-thirds of the chief financial officers who responded called the problem very large or large. Almost 30 percent labeled it moderate. All of the replies from Massachusetts and nearly all from California described the budget problem as large or very large. More than three-quarters of the finance

10 Joseph Burke, "Multi-Campus Systems: The Challenge of the Nineties," in Jerry Gaither (ed.), *The Multicampus System*. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 1998.

11 Steven Gold (ed.), *The Fiscal Crisis of the States: Lessons for the Future*. Washington, D.C.: George Washington University Press, 1995

12 Andreea Serban participated in designing the survey and she and Shahpar Modarresi recorded the results. Jeff Rosen prepared the tables in the text and appendix.

officers from New York also saw the problem as large or very large, as did 57 percent of those from Wisconsin. None of the replies from California, Massachusetts, and New York indicated small or no problem. Even in Florida — with much better budgets than all of the other states except Texas — more than half of the finance officers labeled the problem large, though none described it as very large. Texas provided the exception. None of its budget officers considered the problem very large and only 29 percent checked large. Clearly, all of the finance officers, except those from Texas, saw the budget problem as serious. Two questions remain. Did the budget planning and decisions of the responding campuses reflect their assessment of the severity of the problem? And did their planning and decisions follow the principles for budgeting in difficult times?

Table 1. State Funding Problem (percentage of institutional responses)

	None	Small	Moderate	Large	Very Large
Doctoral	0.0	0.0	42.3	34.6	23.1
Nondoctoral	3.2	6.3	22.2	34.9	33.3
All Institutions	2.2	4.5	28.1	34.8	30.3

(See Appendix Table A for data on individual states)

§ The Planning Process

The process and participants in planning obviously shape the plans produced. Eighty-six percent of the responding institutions had a planning group to deal with the fall in the accustomed levels of state support. All of the responding institutions from Florida, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin had planning bodies. Ninety-two percent of the New York campuses followed this pattern, as did 88 percent from California. Understandably, a third from Florida and quarter of the replies from Texas — the states with the least budget problems — indicated they did not have planning groups. The surprise is that 12 percent of the respondents from California and eight percent from New York had no such body, despite serious budget difficulties. Doctoral institutions from California and New York seemed less likely to have planning bodies than their nondoctoral counterparts.

Table 2. Percent of Institutions with Planning Group

Institutions	% with Planning Groups	% without Planning Groups
Doctoral	84.60%	15.40%
Nondoctoral	85.90%	14.10%
All Institutions	85.60%	14.40%

Nearly all of the planning groups had participants from campus central administrations, and 70 percent included academic deans. Indeed, planning bodies in every responding institution, except a few nondoctoral campuses in New York, included central administrators. Surprisingly, little more than half contained faculty members, only slightly higher than the representation of nonteaching professionals. Just above a third included departmental chairs and students. Other employees and institutional trustees — in that order — represented the least likely participants. The low percent of

trustees probably reflected the preponderance of university systems in the six states, with a single governing board for their constituent campuses. Of course, variances occurred by states. For example, all of planning bodies in Wisconsin included faculty and 86 percent students. Few committees included academic deans in Massachusetts, and 80 percent had faculty in California. Florida, Massachusetts, and Texas reported low representation of faculty. Despite these variations, the general pattern of participants prevailed in most states, with administrators and deans the most common representatives.

Table 3. Participants in Planning Group (% of respondents who checked item)

	Campus Central Admin.	Academic Deans	Faculty	Non-teaching Professionals	Students	Chairs of Academic Depts.	Non-teaching Employees	Campus Trustees
Doctoral	100.0%	81.8%	50.0%	45.5%	31.8%	31.8%	9.1%	13.6%
Non-doctoral	96.4%	65.5%	52.7%	50.9%	34.5%	36.4%	32.7%	10.9%
All Inst.	97.4%	70.1%	51.9%	49.4%	33.8%	35.1%	26.0%	11.7%

(See Appendix Table B for data on individual states)

The Survey asked which groups exercised the dominant role in planning. A number of respondents checked more than one group. The responses left no doubt that the central administration, cited by 88 percent, dominated the planning process. For the next highest groups, only 27 percent listed academic deans and just 18 percent faculty. Doctoral institutions rated the importance of the deans higher than nondoctoral campuses. California institutions claimed faculties had much more influence than those from other states, but even there only 40 percent cited faculty as opposed to 93 percent central administrations. Other participants in all the states — department chairs, nonteaching professionals, other employees, students, and trustees — apparently had little influence.

Table 4. Dominance in Planning Group (% of respondents who checked item)

	Campus Central Admin.	Academic Deans	Faculty	Chairs of Academic Depts.	Non-teaching Professionals	Campus Trustees	Students	Non-teaching Employee
Doctoral	90.9%	36.4%	13.6%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Non-doctoral	87.3%	23.6%	20.0%	7.3%	9.1%	7.3%	3.6%	0.0%
All Inst.	88.3%	27.3%	18.2%	6.5%	6.5%	5.2%	2.6%	0.0%

(See Appendix Table C for state data)

The membership of these planning groups and the domination by senior administrators departs from the precept that urged an inclusive and collaborative planning process. Lacking full representation and active participation, critical constituencies were less likely to support campus plans that

sought fundamental changes. The budget actions treaded warily on faculty turf and concentrated on administrative areas. Probably the size of the budget problem and the need for swift decisions explained the dominance of senior administrators, who supposedly could make both quick and tough decisions. The low level of faculty participation may have been by faculty choice. The reluctance of faculty participants to approve difficult decisions has recently led the Association of Governing Boards to propose changes in the traditional model of shared governance. This report claimed that shared governance gave faculty the equivalent of a veto on many campus decisions.[13] The decisions in most of the states in the early 1990s had to be quick, but the question remains of whether they were tough.

§ Budget Plans

Developing a long-term budget plan represents a basic step in dealing with serious and prolonged fiscal problems. The survey instrument asked the finance officers whether their institutions adopted short-term (one year), medium-term (two-years), long-term (more than two-years), or a plan combing these three time lines. The precept proposed long- as well as short-term plans. The responses indicate that only nine percent of campuses devised long-term plans and 26 percent a combination of shorter and longer plans. Fourteen percent had no plan, 27 percent short-term plans, and 24 percent medium-term plans.

Table 5. Type of Plan Developed (% of responses)

	No Plan	Short-term	Combination	Middle-term	Long-term
Doctoral	19.30%	15.40%	26.90%	34.60%	3.80%
Nondoctoral	12.50%	31.30%	25.00%	20.30%	10.90%
All Institutions	14.40%	26.70%	25.60%	24.40%	8.90%

(See Appendix Table D for data on individual states)

The budget plans did not correspond to the size of the budget problems. The replies from California showed nearly 12 percent with no plan and over 29 percent with short-term plans, only slightly better than the combined percentages from all campuses. The nondoctoral campuses from California caused this result. Forty-six percent of their responses checked short-term, while two-thirds of the doctoral institutions cited combined plans. Seventy-one percent of the responses from Massachusetts noted short-term planning strategies. No institution from Massachusetts checked long term, but 29 percent did indicate combined plans. Slightly more than a third of the New York replies listed combined plans, but 27 percent cited short-term blueprints. Clearly, the serious fiscal problems faced by California, Massachusetts, and New York did not force their colleges and universities to adopt long-term strategies. Florida — with better budgets than nearly all of the states — did follow the assumption that budget plans would correspond with budget severity. Its institutional finance officers said that over 22 percent had no plan, a third short-term, and only 11 percent a combination. Texas — with the least budget difficulty of the six states — relied most heavily on medium-term plans. Wisconsin — with a bigger budget problem than Texas — had a much higher percent of institutions with long-term plans, but a lower percentage with a combination of planning time lines.

13 AGB Statement on Institutional Governance. Washington, DC: Association of Governing Boards, July 31, 1998.

These responses suggest that the size of budget problem did not necessarily dictate the types of budget plans. The results also reveal that a majority of the institutions ignored the precept that serious budget problems demanded long- as well as short-term plans. Campus leaders often complain that budget uncertainty makes long-term planning impossible, as though planning must follow rather than precede funding. They see planning primarily as a distribution method for received resources, rather than a decision model for allocating available resources to priority goals. Postponing planning until after state appropriations guarantees short-term tactics and temporary measures. Long-term plans ensure that resources — whatever their levels — further institutional goals. In times of budget uncertainty, long-range plans become more — not less — critical, although certainly more difficult to develop.

§ Selective Versus Across-the-Board Cuts

Selective rather than across-the-board cuts constitute almost a commandment in budgeting. Despite this precept, the survey responses revealed that more colleges and universities relied on across-the-board cuts than expected. Although 56 percent of the replies said they allocated cuts selectively, 39 percent admitted distributing reductions primarily across the board. The rest of the respondents did not answer the question, all of them from Texas. Again, resource levels did not always predict institutional responses. They did for campuses in Massachusetts and New York. In Massachusetts, 71 percent relied on selective cuts, especially doctoral campuses. In New York, 62 percent also emphasized selective reductions. In contrast, only 35 percent of California's universities cut selectively, an approach used by just 18 percent of its nondoctoral campuses. On the other hand, institutions in states with lesser problems reported higher percentages of selective cuts than anticipated. Selective cuts by institutions reached 67 percent in Florida, 57 percent in Wisconsin, and 54 percent in Texas. These states with the least budget problems showed surprisingly high levels of selective cuts.

Table 6. Distribution of Budget Reductions (% of responses)

	Across-the-Board	Selective	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	34.6%	53.8%	11.5%
Nondoctoral	40.6%	56.3%	3.1%
All Institutions	38.9%	55.6%	5.6%

(See Appendix Table E for state data)

Obviously, the allocation strategy at times failed to follow the pattern of budget severity. Campuses in Florida and Texas with the least serious problems stressed selective cuts. In contrast, those from California — though faced with a fiscal crisis — favored across-the-board reductions, especially the nondoctoral universities. A majority of campuses from five states did cut selectively. Only California institutions relied most heavily on across-the-board cuts. The nondoctoral campuses caused this result. An astonishing 82 percent of the nondoctoral responses said they allocated cuts across the board. In contrast, even states with the least serious problems followed the precept that prescribed selective, not across-the-board, cuts.

A cynic could say that even a higher percentage of campuses should have chosen this course. Though this charge has some validity, the percentages in Massachusetts and New York seem impressive, since it takes courage to choose selective cuts that inevitability creates controversy on campus, even during a fiscal crisis. It takes even more courage to make such cuts in states with lesser budget problems, such as Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin.

§ Expenditure Reduction Versus Revenue Increases

The precept states that expenditure reductions should solve more of the budget problem than revenue increases. Expenditure reductions cut recurring costs, while raising revenues is an uncertain activity. Moreover, raising revenues often result in large tuition and fee increases that limit affordability and access. The Survey asked the finance officers to list the percentage of the budget problem filled by expenditure reductions and by revenue increases. Unfortunately, several of the institutional replies listed percentages that did not add to 100 percent. Eliminating those responses, the rest of the replies indicated that expenditure reductions covered on average 57 percent and revenue increases 43 percent of the difference between required resources and state allocations. This division seems too close for comfort to those who claim that raising revenues really mean raising tuition and fees.

Table 7. Percent of Responses

Institution	Expenditure Decrease	Revenue Increase
Doctoral (17)	52.2%	47.8%
Nondoctoral (36)	60.0%	40.0%
All Institutions	57.5%	42.5%

(See Appendix Table F for data on individual states)

The combined statistics for all institutions conceal some variances by states. Although California campuses had huge fee increases, their respondents claimed that cost cuts handled more than two-thirds of their problem. Those from New York showed a reliance on expenditure reductions only slightly lower than California's universities. Conversely, the replies from Massachusetts conceded that the massive rise in tuition and fees in their state during most of the period filled more than half of their budget shortfall. Expenditure reductions in Florida dealt with three-quarters of the difficulty — not by desire or design, but because the governor and the legislature resisted large tuition increases. Wisconsin also relied primarily on expenditure reductions, in part because of political opposition to rising tuition. Although revenue increases represented three-fourths of the response from Texas campuses, some of the leaders of its doctoral universities lobbied unsuccessfully for larger tuition increases. The Texas percentage stemmed from better budgets rather than big cuts.

The survey also asked the significance of tuition and fees in filling the gap between institutional needs and state funding. Fully, significantly, moderately, slightly, and none constituted the choices. The responses proved telling. The following statistics require a reminder that the responses came from institutional officers and represent their perceptions and not necessarily the actual contribution of tuition and fees. Few respondents checked either none or fully. A third said significantly, slightly less moderately, and 28 percent slightly.

Table 8. Tuition and Fee Increases Filling Budget Gap

	None	Slightly	Moderately	Significantly	Fully	No Response
Doctoral	3.8%	34.6%	26.9%	34.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Nondoctoral	1.6%	25.0%	32.8%	31.3%	4.7%	4.7%
All Institutions	2.2%	27.8%	31.1%	32.2%	3.3%	3.3%

(See Appendix Table G for data on individual states)

The responses, as well as the realities, differed by states. California and Massachusetts had huge percentage increases in tuition and fees, while New York had long freezes followed by large increases. Florida's political leaders resisted such raises. The Massachusetts responses reflected the reality, with over 14 percent saying tuition and fees filled fully the gap between campus needs and state funding, 43 percent significantly, and 29 percent moderately. Replies from California cited 35 percent for both significant and moderate but over 29 percent checked slightly. New York spread its answers. Forty-six percent claimed moderately, 23 percent for both significantly and slightly, and less than four percent each for fully and none. From Texas, 46 percent of the institutional finance officers said significantly, but this result owed more to the better budgets than higher tuition. Political opposition to tuition increases in Florida determined the response of 56 percent as slightly. The results from Wisconsin indicated that tuition and fees made mostly a moderate contribution toward filling the gap between state funding and institutional needs.

The majority of campus responses, except in Massachusetts, suggest a reluctant compliance with the precept that restricting expenditures should solve more of the budget problem than raising revenues. However, tuition and fee increases — the largest source of increased revenues — were larger than they should have been to preserve access in California, Massachusetts, and New York. They would also have been larger in Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin, if some campus leaders had their way.

§ Functional Area Cuts

Although the cuts in functional areas were selective, they may represent a classic case of doing the right thing for the wrong reasons. Not surprisingly, respondents reported the severest reductions in Maintenance and Operations and Institutional Support, which included administration. These functions offered the easiest cuts in the least controversial areas, especially as viewed by faculty and deans. The surprise comes with the admission that Organized Research received the lightest cuts. Overall, campuses protected research even more than the instruction. Functional cuts from the most to the least severe ranked: a tie between Maintenance and Operations and Institutional Support for first place, followed by Academic Support, Student Services, Public Service, Instruction and Departmental Research, and lastly Organized Research. One could argue that Organized Research received the lightest cuts, because it received the least funding. However, this theory would predict the largest cuts to Instruction, which did not occur. The relative protection to public service and student services seems surprising. Possibly, it represented a response to student demands and to state needs.

Table 9. Ranking of Areas Within Institutions by Severity of Budget Reductions (Average)

	Inst. Supp.	Oper./ Main.	Academic Support	Student Services	Public Services	Inst./Dept.	Org. Res.
Doctoral	1.8	2.3	4.1	4.4	3.6	5.3	4.5
Non-doctoral	2.3	2.1	3.5	3.6	4.2	4.7	5.5
All Inst.	2.1	2.1	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.8	5.1

(See Appendix Table H for data on individual states)

Only Texas of the six states gave more protection to Instruction than to Research. Contrary to popular perception, the shielding of Organized Research came from nondoctoral and not doctoral institutions. In five of the six states — California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin — nondoctoral campuses protected Organized Research more than doctoral universities. Only doctoral campuses in Massachusetts shielded research more from budget cuts than the nondoctoral institutions.

Functional cuts affect at least three of the budget principles. The principle of selective as opposed to across-the-board reductions prescribes sharp cuts in some programs and activities and slight or no cuts in others. The precept of protecting both quality and access in undergraduate education implies special shielding of Instruction. The key to functional cuts lies in the third precept, which states that quality and priority — not equity and ease — should direct reductions. To achieve those goals, selective cuts should consider particular programs and services, not functional areas. Presumably, all functions are essential to effective and efficient operations on campus. Given this presumption, the priority and quality of a program or service, not a functional area, should determine the severity of the cut. Overall the severity of functional cuts appear to depart from this precept, for the reductions seemed based more on ease and availability than on priority or quality.

§ Personnel Strategies

Recommended strategies for serious budget problems call for long-term rather than short-term personnel actions. The survey asked institutional finance officers to check the personnel strategies used by their campuses during the period. The choices included vacancy and hiring freeze, salary freeze, salary reduction, early retirement, contract buyouts, layoffs, and none of the above. The question asked the respondents to list whether these actions were state or institution imposed. The state imposed strategies ranked in order of frequency: early retirement (37%); salaries freeze (30%); and vacancy and hiring freeze (20%). The other choices received minimal or no response. Institutions favored vacancy and hiring freezes (69%), but made layoffs their second choice (38%). Salary freeze (26%) ran a distant third. Although over two-thirds picked the easiest path of vacancy and hiring freezes, more than a third took the challenging course of layoffs. The doctoral campuses relied more on layoffs and early retirements than nondoctoral institutions.

Table 10. Personnel Strategies (State Imposed)

	Early Retirement	Salary Freeze	Vacancy and Hiring Freeze	None of the Previous	Layoffs	Salary Reduction	Contract Buyouts
Doctoral	19.2%	15.4%	15.4%	11.5%	0.0%	3.8%	0.0%
Non-doctoral	43.8%	35.5%	21.9%	12.5%	4.7%	1.6%	0.0%
All Inst.	36.7%	30.0%	20.0%	11.2%	3.3%	2.2%	0.0%

(See Appendix Table I for data on individual states)

Table 11. Personnel Strategies (Institution Imposed)

	Vacancy & Hiring Freeze	Layoffs	Salary Freeze	Early Retirement	None of the Previous	Salary Reduction	Contract Buyouts
Doctoral	69.2%	50.0%	34.6%	34.6%	15.4%	23.1%	0.0%
Non-doctoral	68.8%	32.8%	21.9%	15.6%	10.9%	1.6%	4.7%
All Inst.	68.9%	37.8%	25.6%	21.1%	12.2%	7.8%	3.3%

(See Appendix Table J for data on individual states)

The severity of the budget problem did seem to influence the choices. Campuses in Florida and Texas with the least problems stuck largely to vacancy, hiring, and salary freezes. Indeed, a third of the Texas replies said their institutions avoided all of the actions listed in the Survey. Campuses in two states with big budget problems heavily cited layoffs, 77 percent in California and 50 percent in New York, although 92 percent of New York campuses also listed vacancy and hiring freezes. All of the replies from doctoral campuses in Massachusetts noted layoffs, but none of the nondoctoral responses. Few of the returns from Texas and Florida listed layoffs. Conversely, 43 percent of those from Wisconsin reported this action. One hundred percent of the doctoral campuses from California reported using early retirements, much higher than both types of institutions in the other states.

Personnel strategies represented an area where budget severity influenced institutional actions in most of the states. Layoffs, one of the strongest measures, ranked second in frequency for the institutions overall behind vacancy and hiring freezes, and first in California. Clearly, the campuses with the biggest problems tended to follow the budget precept of favoring long-term personnel strategies; although all, except California, made vacancy and hiring freezes their first choice. The heavy use of layoffs in all campus types in California and New York, as well as doctoral institutions in Massachusetts, suggests that colleges and universities tended to follow the precept for long-, rather than just short-term, personnel actions.

§ Faculty Retrenchment

A majority of the institutions that responded to this question said they did not retrench faculty, either nontenured (57%) or tenured (73%). More significant is the obverse statistic. Forty-three percent did retrench nontenured faculty and 27 percent dismissed tenured professors. Retrenchments on most campuses generally affected from less than one to no more than two percent of faculty. However, 10 percent of the campuses said they dismissed more than five percent of their nontenured faculty and surprisingly eight percent claimed they dismissed more than five percent of their tenured faculty. The heaviest cuts came in California, where over two-thirds of the respondents retrench nontenured and over sixty tenured faculty. Nearly all of the nontenured cuts of more than five percent came from California institutions, overwhelmingly from nondoctoral campuses. A quarter of the California responses also said they retrenched more than five percent of their tenured faculty, as did a third of those from Wisconsin. Just under half of the replies from New York said they retrenched non-tenured and a quarter tenured faculty. Most of the New York campuses that took this action terminated less than one and seldom more than two percent of their faculty. In contrast, only 17 percent of the responses from Massachusetts said they retrench nontenured and none of them claimed to dismiss tenured faculty. More institutions in Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin — with much better budget — retrenched both nontenured and tenured faculty than Massachusetts. (See Appendix Tables K, L, and Table M for state data.)

Canceling faculty contracts, especially those for tenured professors, constitutes the most drastic action possible on campus. Viewed from this perspective, the number of institutions that retrenched both nontenured and especially tenured faculty seems remarkable. This drastic step represents a personnel action that had long-term consequences. Clearly, California's record on retrenchment and probably New York's satisfies the precept recommending long- rather than short-term personnel strategies. Indeed, all of the states, except Massachusetts, met the test of this precept when it came to retrenchment. Retrenchment is never desirable but sometimes necessary. Deep budget cuts and shifting student interests make tenure a bit like gold. Its value depends on its relative scarcity in departments.

§ Institutional Productivity and Efficiency

The survey asked campuses to indicate their actions for increasing productivity and efficiency in instruction. The list included increasing faculty teaching load, increasing the ratio of part-time to full-time faculty, retraining faculty, reducing faculty in low enrollment fields, increasing class size, and reducing time-to-degrees. For all institutions, increasing class size (58%) represented the favorite option. The use of technology (53%) ran a close second. Increasing the ratio of part-time to full-time faculty (46%) came next, followed by increasing faculty teaching load (41%), and reducing faculty in low-enrollment fields (39%). Despite the concern in state capitols, at times expressed in legislation, only 27 percent reduced time-to-degrees. Retraining faculty (14%) finished a distant last. Although colleges and universities promised to retrain outsiders to save them from obsolescence, apparently the pledge did not extend to their own faculty.

Table 12. Productivity and Efficiency Actions (% of respondents)

	Increasing Class Sizes	Use of Technology	Increasing Ratio Part-time to Full-time Faculty	Increasing Faculty Teaching Load	Reducing Faculty in Low Enroll. Fields	Reducing Time-to-Degree	Retraining Faculty
Doctoral	42.3	53.8	42.3	46.2	23.1	34.6	11.5
Non-doctoral	64.1	53.1	46.9	39.1	45.3	23.4	15.6
All inst.	57.8	53.3	45.6	41.1	38.9	26.7	14.4

(See Appendix Table N for data on individual states)

Again, this composite picture obscured significant differences among states. Texas institutions, which suffered the least from budget cuts, were much less likely to take any of these actions, except for the use of technology. On the other hand, Florida universities, with better budgets than most of the states, relied heavily on increasing faculty workload, especially at its doctoral units. Wisconsin campuses preferred increasing class size, but a majority of the replies also noted several of the other actions. Campuses in Massachusetts, despite large cuts, fell far below the overall percentages for institutions on every action for increasing productivity and efficiency. None of its institutions checked increasing faculty teaching load, retraining faculty, and reducing time-to-degree. Only 28 percent of its campuses even increased class sizes, the favored action in nearly all of the states. A much higher percent of California institutions listed every one of the actions than appear in the composite percentages of all institutions. The replies from New York also exceeded that composite on nearly all of the items, although its percentages fell considerably below those from California.

Budget severity seems to have had a mixed impact on the choice of productivity and efficiency actions. The overall institutional averages indicate that campuses combined short and long-term actions. A majority increased class size and technology. A large minority took the easy route of increasing the ratio of part-time to full-time faculty, but also increased teaching load and reduced faculty in low-enrollment fields. Much lower percentages took the more fundamental actions of reducing time-to-degree and retraining faculty. The campuses in the survey earned a passing but not impressive grade on the precept for improving productivity and efficiency in instruction. Their decisions leaned toward short-term and easier actions and away from fundamental steps, such as retraining faculty and reducing time to degree.

§ Reducing Classes and Sections

Apparently, many institutions did not view reducing classes and sections as a major response to budget stringency. Forty percent of the respondents indicated no reductions. Even institutions that took this action cut relatively few courses and sections. Nearly a quarter of the respondents said their campuses eliminated less than two percent of their offerings, while only six percent reduced more than ten percent. Nondoctoral campuses appeared much more likely than doctoral institutions to reduce classes and sections. Perhaps the growing complaints about the availability of courses as a cause of extending time-to-degree explains this reluctance to reduce courses and sections. Their eliminations varied considerably by state. Over half of the campuses from Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin did not reduce their classes and sections. Conversely, over three-quarters of the re-

spondents from California and 62 percent from New York said they made such cuts. Close to half of the nondoctoral campuses from California cut more than 10 percent of their offerings. None of the other states had even a single institution that reported this level of eliminations. (Too many respondents failed to answer the question for a fair assessment of actions in Florida.)

Table 13. Class/Section Reduction

	None	Less than 2%	2.1-4%	4.1-6%	6.1-8%	8.1-10%	More than 10%	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	57.7%	19.2%	11.5%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Non-doctoral	32.8%	25.0%	9.4%	9.4%	4.7%	1.6%	7.8%	9.4%
All Inst.	40.0%	23.3%	10.0%	8.9%	3.3%	1.1%	5.6%	7.8%

(See Appendix Table O for data on individual states)

Assessing the reduction of classes and sections against the budget principles presents a problem. The judgment depends on whether campuses offered an excessive number of courses and sections, which the Survey could not determine. Still, the large minority of campuses that failed to eliminate classes and section — and the low percentages cut by those who did — suggest that most of the respondents did not follow the precept for raising productivity and efficiency in instruction. The doctoral campuses appeared especially reluctant to cut their courses and sections.

§ Program Elimination

Reduced or restrained resources make elimination of programs with lower enrollment and of lesser quality a viable option for improving performance and productivity. Only about a third of the respondents said their institutions eliminated academic programs. Many more nondoctoral campuses (44%) took this action than doctoral institutions (19%). Responses by states often did not coincide with their budget problems. Of the three states with the most difficulty, only a majority of New York campuses (62%) eliminated programs. California (35%) and Massachusetts (43%) reported much lower percentages. The largest percentage came in Wisconsin (71%), a state with a less severe budget problem. The minimal program cuts in Florida and Texas matched their fiscal condition during the period.

A second question requested the number and type of programs eliminated. The numbers given indicate that nearly all of the program cuts occurred in the nondoctoral campuses and mostly at the undergraduate level. New York and surprisingly Texas made the largest cuts, and these came mostly at the undergraduate level. Florida, as expected given its mild budget pressures, ended the fewest programs. California and New York cut the most masters program, although they were small in number and mostly at nondoctoral campuses. Only California reported eliminating doctoral programs, and these cuts remained few in number.

Another question asked whether campuses experienced a net decrease or increase in academic programs. The replies produced some unexpected results. Twenty-seven percent of the campuses reported a decrease in undergraduate programs, 22 percent noted an increase, and 40 percent cited no change. Eleven percent failed to answer this question. Nondoctoral campuses were more likely

to decrease undergraduate programs than doctoral universities. The biggest surprise came on graduate programs. The response from Florida shows a net increase of graduate programs at 67 percent of the institutions and an increase of 56 percent in undergraduate programs, both mostly at nondoctoral campuses. The largest percentages of campuses with net losses in undergraduate programs came in New York (46%), California (35%), and Massachusetts (29%) — the states with the worst budget difficulties. The net decreases in undergraduate programs on campuses in each of the states far exceeded the net declines at the graduate level. Only Wisconsin reported that more institutions reduced graduate than undergraduate programs. These statistics seem to depart from the budgetary principles of protecting access and quality in undergraduate education.

Table 14. Program Net Increases/Decreases

Undergraduate Programs

	Net Increase	Net Decrease	No Change	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	23.1%	19.2%	42.3%	15.4%
Nondoctoral	21.9%	29.7%	39.1%	9.4%
All Institutions	22.2%	26.7%	40.0%	11.1%

Graduate Programs

	Net Increase	Net Decrease	No Change	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	34.6%	7.7%	46.2%	11.5%
Nondoctoral	39.1%	14.1%	34.4%	12.5%
All Institutions	37.8%	12.2%	37.8%	12.2%

§ Organizational Restructuring

Restructuring by combining or eliminating units constitutes an accepted approach to cutting costs. As expected, campuses took that action most often in their central administrations (47%). Surprisingly, academic departments come next with 34 percent. Thirty-one percent of the respondents said their institutions combined or eliminated units, offices, and activities in both Maintenance and Operations and Student Affairs. Twenty-two percent combined or eliminated colleges, schools, or faculties. Academic Support was the least affected area, with action by only 20 percent of the campuses. The overall responses show that a majority of the responding institutions did not follow the precept for restructuring by combining offices and activities. Most of this activity occurred in their central administrations, although over a third combined or closed academic departments. The latter action seems impressive, given the controversy inevitably produced by such decisions.

Wisconsin was the most likely — Florida and Texas the least likely — to combine or eliminate units in all of the areas. California emphasized restructuring central administrations and student affairs; New York academic departments, central administrations, and student affairs; Massachusetts stressed maintenance and central administrations. Comparing this practice to the precept raises the

classic dilemma of how much is enough. Campuses generally combined and eliminated administrative functions, possibly because of external and internal complaints about administrative bloat. However, over a third merged academic departments and 22 percent combined large academic units. The bottom line is that most of this restructuring occurred in administration; and, even in this area, a majority of campuses took this action only in two states, California and Wisconsin.

Table 15. Institutional Areas Combined or Eliminated (% of respondents)

	Campus Central Admin.	Departments	Student Affairs	Maintenance and Operations	Colleges, Schools, Faculties	Academic Support
Doctoral	42.3	26.9	23.1	30.8	19.2	15.4
Non-doctoral	48.4	37.5	34.4	31.3	23.4	21.9
All Inst.	46.7	34.4	31.1	31.1	22.2	20.0

(See Appendix Table P for data on individual states)

§ Privatization

Some outsiders have pushed privatizing activities and services as a way of improving efficiency and cutting costs on campus. Although over thirty percent of the respondents said their institution privatized some activities or services, the extent of these actions seemed small. California and Texas reported more institutions privatizing than the composite percentages for all campuses. Florida's percentage comes close to that of the combined institutions, while New York fell somewhat below the average. Wisconsin reported no such actions, while campuses from Massachusetts noted relatively few. However, 46 percent of the responses from Texas and 41 percent from California said they had done some privatizing. The Survey asked for indications of the areas privatized. Maintenance led with Administration close behind. Very few respondents marked academic support or student services. Five of the six states reported some activity in administration and maintenance, while only two noted some privatization in academic support services and student affairs. The responses indicated that a considerable number of campuses experimented with privatization but only in restricted areas and to slight degrees.

Table 16. Institutional Privatization Percentage

Doctoral	26.9
Non-Doctoral	32.8
All Institutions	31.1

(See Appendix Table Q and Table R for state data)

§ Revising Missions

One would have thought that budget pressures would push campuses to revise their missions. Instead, only 16 percent of the colleges and universities that responded indicated mission changes. Nondoctoral campuses seemed somewhat more likely to take this step than doctoral units. Massachusetts, despite a free fall in state funding in the late 1980s and early 1990s, reported no mission changes. Only 12 percent of the replies from California and New York, which also faced large problems, claimed they altered institutional missions. Except for New York and Texas, most of the changes came in the nondoctoral institutions. Only this type of campuses revised their missions in California, Florida, and Wisconsin. New York was the only state where doctoral campuses made more changes than their nondoctoral counterparts. The severity of the budget problem seems to have little or no effect on mission changes. The highest percentages of campuses claiming mission changes came from Texas and Wisconsin, and not from California, Massachusetts, and New York, which received the largest cuts in budgets. Certainly, the campuses that responded to this survey did not practice the precept of refocusing missions on institutional strengths and student demands. (See Appendix Table S for state data.)

Only a few campuses revised their missions, but the changes made may explain this surprising result. The Survey offered the choices of reduced or increased emphasis on undergraduate education, graduate education, research, and public service. No institution reduced the emphasis on undergraduate education, but only nine percent increased it. At the same time, only one percent reduced their emphasis on graduate education but eight percent increased it. One percent diminished, while six percent raised their emphasis on research, although the increases came only in Texas. The nondoctoral campuses contributed much more to the increased emphasis on graduate education and research than did the doctoral campuses, except in New York. Public service received reduced emphasis from no institution and increased stress from six percent, with nondoctoral campuses contributing the most to this result. Even the few colleges and universities that altered their mission did not seem to focus on institutional strengths and student needs.

Table 17. Mission Revision

	Emphasis on Graduate Education		Emphasis on Undergraduate Education		Emphasis on Research		Emphasis on Public Service	
	Red.	Inc.	Red.	Inc.	Red.	Inc.	Red.	Inc.
Doctoral	0.00%	3.85%	0.00%	3.85%	0.00%	3.85%	0.00%	3.85%
Nondoctoral	1.56%	9.38%	0.00%	10.94%	1.56%	6.25%	0.00%	6.25%
All Institutions	1.11%	7.78%	0.00%	8.89%	1.11%	5.56%	0.00%	5.56%

Only nondoctoral campuses in California noted reductions in graduate education and in research. Twenty-seven percent of them increased their emphasis on undergraduate education, while none of the doctoral campuses took this action. Only California, New York, and Texas increased the emphasis on undergraduate education. New York was the only state where doctoral institutions cited increased emphasis in graduate education. All of the nondoctoral and none of the doctoral campuses in California that changed missions reduced their emphasis on graduate studies and increased it on undergraduate education. Only Texas noted an increase in research.

These responses differed from conventional expectations on two counts. First, few campuses revised their missions despite the budget problems. Second, among the few institutions that took this action, the percentage that increased their emphasis on graduate education and research far exceeded those that reduced their missions in these areas. These responses suggest a departure from the precept of refocusing missions based on quality and student demand and of protecting access and quality in undergraduate education.

§ Quality Initiatives

Education experts in the late 1980s and early 1990s urged colleges and universities to adopt quality initiatives to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. Outcome assessment, "best practices" in undergraduate education, and total quality management or continuous quality improvement constituted the most popular initiatives. The campus responses indicated limited implementation of any of these programs. Nearly all — or at least large majorities — of the campuses reported some activity in these areas, but most seemed to dabble rather than absorb these innovations. Outcomes assessment achieved the best record, but only 22 percent of the responses indicating extensive implementation. The replies on implementation for TQM/CQI (17%) and best educational practices (8%) showed that few institutions exhibited a real commitment to these reforms.

Table 18. Student Outcome Assessment

	Extensive	Limited	Not at All	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	15.4%	57.7%	7.7%	19.2%
Nondoctoral	25.0%	65.6%	4.7%	4.7%
All Institutions	22.2%	63.3%	5.6%	8.9%

Best Practices

	Extensive	Limited	Not at All	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	7.7%	26.9%	34.6%	30.8%
Nondoctoral	7.8%	59.4%	20.3%	12.5%
All Institutions	7.8%	50.0%	24.4%	17.8%

Total Quality Management/Continuous Quality Improvement

	Extensive	Limited	Not at All	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	23.1%	57.7%	15.4%	3.8%
Nondoctoral	14.1%	67.2%	15.6%	3.1%
All Institutions	16.7%	64.4%	15.6%	3.3%

(See Appendix Table T, Table U, and Table V for state data)

Texas reported the most activity in assessment, and California the least. Not a single campus from Florida, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin noted extensive implementation of best practices in undergraduate education. Texas, where 17 percent of the respondents claimed extensive implementation, showed the most interest in best practices. Most of the state responses indicated slightly more implementation of TQM and CQI, but again not a single reply from Massachusetts noted extensive implementation. Although the replies from states showed slight variations, nearly all indicate little or no commitment to these initiatives. The responses suggest that campuses viewed these programs as add-ons that increased costs rather than as means for improving efficiency and effectiveness. This lack of interest in three initiatives that promised fundamental changes in institutional operations and behaviors indicates a preference for short-term, incremental measures rather than systemic reforms and a departure from the budget principles.

§ Redesigning Undergraduate Curriculum

Some commentators assumed that budget cuts would encourage campuses to redesign their undergraduate curricula. The survey asked first whether institutions took this action. It then queried whether the credit hours for graduation, general education, and academic majors were increased, decreased, or maintained. Respondents said that slightly more than a third of their institutions redesigned their curricula, with nondoctoral campuses more than twice as likely to take this action than doctoral institutions. Surprisingly, California, Massachusetts, and New York — with the largest fiscal problems — reported percentages below or just above those for all institutions combined. Florida and Wisconsin were by far the most, and Texas the least likely to take this action. Remembering that only a third of the institutions altered their curricula, the largest changes came in decreasing credit hours for graduation. Redesigning the curricula obviously did not represent a top priority for institutions in the survey states. Again, the practice seems to fall short of the precept for productivity and performance, including instruction, especially in the three states facing the biggest budget problems. (See Appendix Table W for data.)

Campuses taking this action concentrated on reversing the trend toward credit creep in the requirements for degrees, general education, and majors, although 29 percent of those from Massachusetts actually increased the credits for majors. Legislation to reduce excessive credit hours for graduation resulted in Florida universities taking the most aggressive actions in all three areas. Campuses in most of the other states proved much more passive, although 43 percent of the institutions in Wisconsin decreased the credits for graduation.

§ Net Staffing Changes

Campuses generally followed the expectations of net decreases in full-time faculty, net increases in part-time faculty, and net decreases in administrative and support staff. Net full-time faculty fell in 54 percent of the institutions, but 28 percent reported increases. Much higher percentages of campuses reported large net losses of full-time faculty in New York (81%) and California (77%). Many fewer institutions in Massachusetts (29%), which also had severe budget problems, reported such losses. Massachusetts showed the same percentage loss as Texas, which suffered the least from fiscal difficulties. In Wisconsin, with only a moderate problem, 71 percent of the responding institutions claimed a net loss of full-time faculty. As anticipated, only 11 percent of Florida's universities reported such a net loss. Sizeable majorities in Florida (79%) and Texas (54%) reported net increases of full-time faculty. The other states had small or no increases, except Massachusetts,

where 29 percent of the replies reported both increases and decreases. Part-time faculty increased at a majority of the campuses responding to the survey. Healthy majorities of institutions exhibited increases in all of the states except California, where universities showed a much larger percentages of decreases than increases in part-time faculty.

More than half of all campuses claimed net decreases in support staff, but 30 percent showed increases. California and New York had unusually large percentages with decreases. Texas, Florida, and surprisingly Massachusetts reported higher percentages of campuses increasing support staff than other states. As expected, half of all reporting campuses cited decreases in administrators, but 28 percent noted net increases. Replies from California and New York revealed net decreases in administrators above those for the combined institutions. Conversely, Florida, Texas, and again Massachusetts showed unusually high percentages of campuses with net increases in administrators. Though this result in Florida and Texas, with minor fiscal problems, was expected, Massachusetts appears an anomaly, since it had huge budget reductions.

Again, the severity of budget difficulty did not always dictate the changes in net staffing. Bad budgets did force large net losses in California and New York but not in Massachusetts. Florida and Texas, with better budgets, showed increases, but not Wisconsin. A majority of the responding institutions did appear to follow the budget principles. They exhibited net losses in full-time faculty as well as administrators and support staff. The size of the increases in part-time faculty, coupled with large decreases in full-time faculty, especially in New York and Wisconsin, undoubtedly reduced costs but surely raised problems of instructional quality. This result is a reminder that the budget principles sought quality as well as efficiency.

§ Enrollment Strategies

Conventional wisdom would predict that public colleges and universities would protect student access by maintaining or increasing enrollments, depending on levels of student demand. A slight majority of the campuses did change their enrollment strategies during the period but not always in the direction assumed. The common assumption about enrollment decisions fails to consider the conflict between quality and access that comes with budget cuts. Reducing enrollment may become a viable alternative to avoid eroding quality, but only after campuses take every possible action to cut costs. Of those institutions in the Survey that changed their enrollment strategy, 60 percent increased their student numbers, but 40 percent decreased them. Some campuses, especially the nondoctoral universities in California, seemed to reduce enrollment as their first reaction rather than their last resort, despite a tidal wave of new students. Eighty percent of the nondoctoral campuses in California decreased, while only 20 percent increased their student numbers. Fully three-quarters of institutions in California that changed their strategy cut enrollment. Replies from all of the other states showed more campuses increased than decreased enrollments, although Florida (40%) and New York (31%) exhibited sizeable percentages that reduced their student numbers, especially at doctoral campuses. All of the Massachusetts institutions that changed their enrollments increased them. Strong majorities in Texas, Wisconsin, and Florida also increased enrollment. (See Appendix Table X for data.)

Reducing undergraduate enrollment is a bit like dropping hydrogen bombs: useful as a threat but devastating when used. On the other hand, the deep enrollment cuts in California helped produce a compact with the governor that traded budget increases for enrollment increases. However, California with "tidal wave II" of nearly a half million new students presents a unique situation. It did not offer a solution for other states. Half of the doctoral institutions in Florida, a state with a huge increase in student demand, reduced enrollment, although two-thirds of the nondoctoral campuses in-

creased their student numbers. Texas, with rising demand, tended to increase enrollment. New York with only slight increases in student demand exhibited the same pattern, especially in the City University of New York, because of the rising enrollments from immigrant population. The Wisconsin system changed its previous policy of decreasing enrollment to raise support per student. It promised enrollment increases in response to complaints from state officials. Certainly, California campuses and to a lesser extent those in Florida did not follow the precept for protecting access to undergraduate education.

§ Characteristic Strategies

One survey question tried to capture the overall institutional reaction to the budget problems of the period. It asked campus finance officers to indicate the three actions that best characterized their institutional strategy for dealing with the budgetary stringency. They had the following choices:

- Restructuring of organization and operation;
- Revising campus mission;
- Revising degree requirements and curriculum;
- Restructuring teaching and learning processes;
- Changing enrollment strategy;
- Raising revenues; and
- Restricting expenditures.

The first four represent fundamental reforms, the last three incremental changes.

Campus replies listed restricting expenditures (67%), restructuring organization and operations (66%), and raising revenues (49%) as the three actions that best characterized their strategies for dealing with the budget problems. A third cited changing enrollment strategies as a top characteristic. Few respondents listed the fundamental changes of revising missions, restructuring teaching and learning, and revising degree requirements and curricula as their most characteristic actions.

Table 19. Budget Stringency Strategies

	Restr. Exp.	Restr. Org. and Op.	Raising Rev.	Enroll. Strat.	Degree Req. and Curr.	Teaching & Leaning Process	Campus Mission
Doctoral	76.9%	73.1%	73.1%	23.1%	0.0%	3.8%	0.0%
Non-doctoral	62.5%	62.5%	39.1%	37.5%	12.5%	7.8%	3.1%
All Inst.	66.7%	65.6%	48.9%	33.3%	8.9%	6.7%	2.2%

(See Appendix Table Y for state data)

All of the responses from the states followed this pattern, with of course variations in percentages. Replies from California placed restricting expenditures as the unchallenged first, with 88 percent citing it as a characteristic action. Slightly more than half of the responses from this state also

listed raising revenues, restructuring organizations and operations, and changing enrollment strategy. The other structural changes dealing with mission, curriculum, and teaching and learning got little or no support from California campuses. Most of the support for restructuring of organization and operations came from doctoral campuses. In Massachusetts, restructuring of organization and operations and raising revenues tied for first place (71%), while restricting expenditures came in a distant third (43%). Not a single institution from the Bay State listed one of the other choices. New York ranked restructuring of organization and operations first (85%), restricting expenditures second (73%), and raising revenues trailing in third place (46%). New York respondents gave little or no support to the other items of revising missions, curricula, or the teaching/learning process. In the three states with lesser budget problems, Florida institutions concentrated on restricting expenditures and Wisconsin on changing enrollment strategy, while Texas spread its choices across the usual three choices of restructuring, raising revenues, and restricting expenditures.

All of the state responses included restructuring their organizations and operations among their most characteristic actions. Not one state group of institutions rated revising campus mission, revising degree requirements and curriculum, and restructuring teaching and learning even close to their top three. Moreover, restructuring of organization and operation seemed largely confined to their administrations. Responses to a similar survey of State Higher Education Finance Officers (SHEFOs) and the finance officers of university systems in these six states raise some question as to the extent of restructuring on campuses.[14] Two-thirds of the SHEFOs claimed that campuses relied mostly on raising revenues and restricting expenditures. Only the SHEFOs from California and Massachusetts cited restructuring as a major strategy. The latter probably came from the addition of two campuses to the University of Massachusetts system. It is unclear why the SHEFO in California included restructuring as a major strategy. Whereas institutional finance officers tended to list restructuring of organization and operations as the second strategy, the finance officers from university systems in the six states saw it as a distant third. Two-thirds of the latter listed raising revenues and restricting expenditures as best characterizing the actions of campuses in their systems.

§ Impact on Instruction, Research, and Service

Of course, the true test of budget strategies in bad or good times is the impact on the missions of instruction, research, and service. The final question in the survey asked whether the quality of, and access to, undergraduate education, and the quality of graduate education, research activities, and public service increased, decreased, or was maintained during the period. Nearly half of the institutional finance officers claimed their campus maintained the quality of undergraduate education, but 30 percent conceded that it decreased. Forty-one percent admitted access to undergraduate education declined, whereas only 40 percent considered it maintained. Comfortable majorities of the respondents believed their campuses preserved the quality of graduate education, research, and public service. The responses of State and System Finance officers generally support these institutional assessments. The statistics suggest that large minorities of the respondents failed to follow the precept for protecting quality and access in undergraduate education.

14 Joseph Burke, "Multi-Campus Systems: The Challenge of the Nineties," in Jerry Gaither (ed.), *The Multicampus System*. Stylus Publishing, 1998.

Table 20. Quality of Undergraduate Education

	Increased	Decreased	Maintained	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	7.7%	30.8%	38.5%	23.1%
Nondoctoral	15.6%	29.7%	53.1%	1.6%
All Institutions	13.3%	30.0%	48.9%	7.8%

Access to Undergraduate Education

	Increased	Decreased	Maintained	Did Not Answer
Doctoral	11.5%	34.6%	30.8%	23.1%
Nondoctoral	10.9%	43.8%	43.8%	1.6%
All Institutions	11.1%	41.1%	40.0%	7.8%

(See Appendix Table Z1 and Z2 for state data)

Although 47 percent of the replies from California claimed their campus maintained the quality of undergraduate education, an equal percentage confessed that quality declined. Campuses in Massachusetts and New York did somewhat better. A majority of their responses considered their institutions maintained the quality of undergraduate education, but 29 percent in Massachusetts and 39 percent in New York conceded that quality diminished. A third of the responses from Florida claimed a decline, while those from Texas and Wisconsin gave higher percentages to increased than to decreased quality.

Nearly two-thirds of the California replies admitted a decline in access to undergraduate education. Half of those from New York said access fell, but only 29 percent gave this response from Massachusetts. More than half of Florida campuses, faced with a huge increase in student demand, conceded that access declined. Three-quarters of Texas institutions indicated they maintained or increased undergraduate access. A high percentage of the Wisconsin campuses failed to respond to the question. Clearly, severe fiscal problems affected the quality of undergraduate education on many campuses and took an even greater toll on undergraduate access.

§ Budget Allocation Factors

If the campuses often fell short of practicing the budget principles, the funding factors used by states did little to encourage fundamental change during the first half of the 1990s. Despite declines in the accustomed level of state support, these factors changed only slightly during the period. The ranking of the first four factors that influenced budget allocations remained; base budgets, enrollments, salary increases, inflation, and institutional missions. The move of productivity and performance ahead of special projects constituted the only change in position during the period, although enrollments increased its hold on second place.

Campuses in California and Florida with the greatest rise in enrollment demand did report that enrollments replaced base budgets as the leading allocation factor. In California, the shift came from campuses in California State University and not from those in the University of California. In

Florida, the largest change came from doctoral campuses, though the nondoctoral institutions also saw increased importance for enrollments. Base budgets remained the first factor in the other four states. Enrollments ranked fourth in Massachusetts at the beginning of the period but jumped to third at the end. They remained second in the other states but moved closer to base budgets. Despite the changes, base budgets at the end of the period still ranked first for all the institutions combined. Performance and productivity, which one would assume budget pressures would push, remained among the least importance factors, though they moved ahead of special projects. Generally, doctoral institutions saw base budgets as rating higher and enrollments somewhat lower than nondoctoral campuses. Clearly, the budgeting factors used by the States did little to support the budget principles.

§ Conclusion

As is often the case, campus changes during the period appeared far less dramatic than commentators predicted and critics desired. The first half of the 1990s constituted something less than the "defining moment" for public higher education. The survey results support the conclusion of *The Chronicle of Higher Education* in 1994.[15] It claimed that, despite cuts in the usual levels of funding and calls for radical reforms, "observers see only isolated examples of fundamental change." "There has been a good bit of hunkering down as opposed to radical restructuring," said Mark Musick, President of the Southern Regional Education Board. Though he speculated that "radical changes happen only during free falls," the survey responses indicate that even free falls in funding failed to produce radical reforms in California or Massachusetts.

The actual practices of the campuses in the Survey fell short of both the predictions and the principles. Few fundamental changes occurred; and even institutions with the worst budget problems often failed to follow the budget principles. Many — at times most — of the responding campuses favored hierarchical over collaborative planning, short- over long-term plans and strategies, incremental over fundamental changes, comprehensive over curtailed missions, and provider- over client-driven decisions.

The overall record of the institutional practices compared with the budget principles proved disappointing, though perhaps not surprising.

1. Planning was not inclusive and collaboration, for it left faculty and especially students underrepresented and let the administration dominate;
2. Only a distinct minority of the institutions had long- as well as short-term budget plans;
3. A solid majority of campuses did rely primarily on selective cuts, but a strong minority allocated across the board;
4. The criteria for cuts seemed to reflect ease and availability more than quality or priority;
5. Expenditure reductions did exceed revenue increases on most campus, but tuition and fee increases restricted access in several states;
6. Although a solid majority of institutions favored short-term personnel strategies, a strong minority included layoffs and retrenchments;
7. Most campuses acted to raise both productivity and performance in administration and management, but most avoided academic areas;
8. Most campuses did not eliminate academic programs to improve quality and efficiency;
9. Most campuses limited restructuring of offices and activities to administrative functions;

15 July 20, 1994, p. A17.

10. Few campuses refocused their missions based on institutional strengths and student demands;
11. Most campuses did protect quality and access in undergraduate education, but a large minority conceded that one or both declined.

If the institutional record on producing fundamental change during the period proved disappointing, the budgeting practices of the states did little to encourage campus reforms. Base budgets, enrollments, and inflation remained the dominant factors in state funding, and performance and productivity received scant emphasis.

The institutional practices in the six states often failed to follow the budget principles. Perhaps some failure was inevitable, for it is always easier to prescribe than to practice principles. Despite this reality, the gap between practice and precept as shown in this Survey seems wider than states are likely to accept for long. The practices often reflected the priorities of provider-driven enterprises directed more by the concerns of administrators and faculty than the needs of students and states. Yet service to students and states is supposedly the characteristic that distinguishes public from private higher education.

The purpose of this paper is not to assess blame, for perfection is never possible when pursuing even the most obvious budget principles. The pressure to avoid controversial decisions is most persistent in difficult times when every campus group feels threatened and compelled to protect its domain. Yet even considering the difficult challenges and circumstances, budget practices on many campuses seemed soft and seldom stiffened by the budget principles. The reality that some colleges and universities did follow the principles demonstrates that they were not an impossible ideals, good in theory but unworkable in practice.

This study represents more than a historical exercise of what happened in what now seems a distant — perhaps forgotten — past. Failures can prove more instructive than successes. The lessons learned from the budget practices in the first half of the 1990S should help public colleges and universities respond better to their next fiscal crisis, which will come inevitably with the next national recession. But memory in academe seems short. In 1995, Gordon Davies, then the chief higher education officer in Virginia, proclaimed: "The prosperity of the 1970s and 1980s is over."[16] Apparently, it has taken just three years of better budgets to make us forget the lessons we should have learned in the first half of the 1990s. We need to recall those lessons before the return of the next recession. Not the least of these lessons is that principles should stiffen practices in campus budgeting for trying times.

16 Education Commission of the States, Policy Papers on Higher Education, *Restructuring Colleges and Universities: The Challenges and Consequences*. Denver: ECS, April 1996, p. 5.

Appendix

Table A. Budget Severity by State (% of institutional responses)

	None	None	Small	Moderate	Large	Very Large
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	18.2%	81.8%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	23.5%	70.6%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	11.1%	33.3%	55.6%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	23.8%	33.3%	42.9%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	23.1%	34.6%	42.3%
TX	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	87.5%	12.5%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	12.5%	18.8%	31.3%	37.5%	0.0%
	All Inst.	8.3%	12.5%	50.0%	29.2%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%

Table B. Participants in Planning Group (% of respondents who checked item)

		Campus Trustees	Campus Central Admin.	Academic Deans	Chairs of Acad. Depts.	Faculty	Non-teaching Profess.	Non-teaching Employees	Students
CA	Doctoral	20.0%	100.0%	100.0%	60.0%	80.0%	20.0%	20.0%	40.0%
	Non-doctoral	10.0%	100.0%	70.0%	50.0%	80.0%	60.0%	30.0%	40.0%
	All Inst.	13.3%	100.0%	80.0%	53.3%	80.0%	46.7%	26.7%	40.0%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%
	Non-doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.5%	0.0%	25.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	100.0%	83.3%	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	16.7%	33.3%
MA	Doctoral	50.0%	100.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	20.0%	100.0%	20.0%	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	100.0%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	75.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	25.0%
	Non-doctoral	5.0%	90.0%	70.0%	50.0%	55.0%	55.0%	40.0%	35.0%
	All Inst.	4.2%	91.7%	70.8%	41.7%	54.2%	54.2%	33.3%	33.3%
TX	Doctoral	14.3%	100.0%	85.7%	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%	0.0%	14.3%
	Non-doctoral	27.3%	100.0%	63.6%	36.4%	36.4%	36.4%	18.2%	18.2%
	All Inst.	22.2%	100.0%	72.2%	27.8%	33.3%	33.3%	11.1%	16.7%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Non-doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%	100.0%	80.0%	80.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	100.0%	85.7%	28.6%	100.0%	100.0%	57.1%	85.7%

Table C. Dominance in Planning Group (% of respondents who checked item)

		Campus Central Admin.	Academic Deans	Faculty	Chairs of Acad. Depts.	Non-teaching Profess.	Campus Trustees	Students	Non-teaching Employees
CA	Doctoral	100.0%	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	90.0%	30.0%	40.0%	20.0%	10.0%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	93.3%	33.3%	40.0%	20.0%	6.7%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%
FL	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	100.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	100.0%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	75.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	75.0%	30.0%	20.0%	5.0%	5.0%	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	75.0%	33.3%	16.7%	4.2%	4.2%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%
TX	Doctoral	85.7%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	18.2%	9.1%	0.0%	9.1%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	94.4%	22.2%	5.6%	0.0%	5.6%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	80.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	85.7%	42.9%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%

Table D. Type of Plan Developed (% of responses)

		No Plan	Short-term	Middle-term	Long-term	Combination
CA	Doctoral	16.67%	0.00%	0.00%	16.67%	66.67%
	Nondoctoral	9.09%	45.45%	18.18%	18.18%	9.09%
	All Inst.	11.76%	29.41%	11.76%	11.76%	29.41%
FL	Doctoral	33.33%	0.00%	66.67%	0.00%	0.00%
	Nondoctoral	16.67%	50.00%	16.67%	0.00%	16.67%
	All Inst.	22.22%	33.33%	33.33%	0.00%	11.11%
MA	Doctoral	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%
	Nondoctoral	0.00%	80.00%	0.00%	0.00%	20.00%
	All Inst.	0.00%	71.43%	14.29%	0.00%	28.57%
NY	Doctoral	20.00%	20.00%	20.00%	0.00%	40.00%
	Nondoctoral	14.27%	28.60%	19.00%	4.80%	33.33%
	All Inst.	15.40%	26.90%	19.20%	3.80%	34.60%
TX	Doctoral	12.50%	12.50%	75.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Nondoctoral	18.75%	12.50%	25.00%	12.50%	31.25%
	All Inst.	16.70%	12.50%	41.70%	8.30%	20.80%
WI	Doctoral	50.00%	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
	Nondoctoral	0.00%	0.00%	40.00%	40.00%	20.00%
	All Inst.	14.29%	14.29%	28.57%	28.57%	14.29%

Table E. Distribution of Budget Reductions (% of Response)

		Across the Board	Selective	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	81.8%	18.2%	0.0%
	All Inst.	64.7%	35.3%	0.0%
FL	Doctoral	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	16.7%	83.3%	0.0%
	All Inst.	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	40.0%	60.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	71.4%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%
	All Inst.	38.5%	61.5%	0.0%
TX	Doctoral	12.5%	50.0%	37.5%
	Nondoctoral	31.3%	56.3%	12.5%
	All Inst.	25.0%	54.2%	20.8%
WI	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	40.0%	60.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	42.9%	57.1%	0.0%

Table F. Expenditure Increases Versus Budget Reducations

		Across the Board	Selective
CA	Doctoral	70.0%	30.0%
	Nondoctoral	68.2%	29.8%
	All Inst.	69.1%	30.8%
FL	Doctoral	90.0%	10.0%
	Nondoctoral	73.5%	26.5%
	All Inst.	76.8%	23.2%
MA	Doctoral	52.0%	48.0%
	Nondoctoral	42.5%	57.5%
	All Inst.	46.0%	54.0%
NY	Doctoral	58.4%	41.6%
	Nondoctoral	65.5%	34.5%
	All Inst.	63.6%	36.4%
TX	Doctoral	23.4%	76.6%
	Nondoctoral	22.4%	77.6%
	All Inst.	23.0%	77.0%
WI	Doctoral	75.0%	25.0%
	Nondoctoral	81.25%	18.75%
	All Inst.	78.0%	22.0%

Table G. Tuition and Fees Filling the Gap

		None	Slightly	Moderate	Significantly	Fully	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	36.4%	36.4%	27.3%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	29.4%	35.3%	35.3%	0.0%	0.0%
FL	Doctoral	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
	All Inst.	11.1%	55.6%	11.1%	11.1%	0.0%	11.1%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	14.3%	28.6%	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	4.8%	23.8%	42.9%	23.8%	4.8%	0.0%
	All Inst.	3.8%	23.1%	46.2%	23.1%	3.8%	0.0%
TX	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	18.8%	18.8%	43.8%	6.3%	12.5%
	All Inst.	0.0%	29.2%	12.5%	45.8%	4.2%	8.3%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	14.3%	57.1%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%

Table H. Ranking of Areas Within Institutions by Severity of Budget Reductions (average)

		Inst. Support	Student Services	Operation & Maintenance	Academic Support	Public Service	Instruction & Dept. Research	Organized Research
CA	Doctoral	2.5	4.8	2.5	3.8	3.2	6.0	4.5
	Non-doctoral	2.5	2.6	2.1	3.3	3.8	3.4	7.0
	All Inst.	2.5	3.4	2.3	3.5	3.4	4.5	5.3
FL	Doctoral	1.7	6.5	2.0	5.5	3.7	3.0	4.5
	Non-doctoral	2.8	4.8	3.0	3.2	3.0	5.5	4.8
	All Inst.	2.4	5.3	2.8	3.8	3.2	4.9	4.7
MA	Doctoral	2.0	3.5	1.0	4.0	4.5	6.0	7.0
	Non-doctoral	1.5	3.8	1.5	2.7	5.5	5.0	5.0
	All Inst.	1.7	3.7	1.3	3.2	5.0	5.4	6.0
NY	Doctoral	1.4	3.5	2.0	3.2	3.0	4.5	4.0
	Non-doctoral	2.6	3.3	1.7	3.9	4.5	4.3	5.3
	All Inst.	2.3	3.3	1.8	3.8	4.1	4.3	5.0
TX	Doctoral	1.7	4.0	2.7	5.0	4.5	5.0	3.7
	Non-doctoral	1.7	4.9	1.8	3.3	3.9	6.1	5.3
	All Inst.	1.7	4.7	2.0	3.7	4.0	5.8	4.9
WI	Doctoral	1.0	4.0	3.5	4.0	4.0	7.0	4.5
	Non-doctoral	1.8	2.8	3.2	3.4	6.0	4.6	6.0
	All Inst.	1.6	3.1	3.3	3.6	5.3	5.3	5.5

Table I. Personnel Strategies (Institution Imposed)

		Vacancy and Hiring Freeze	Layoffs	Salary Freeze	Early Retirement	None of the Previous	Salary Reduction	Contract Buyouts
CA	Doctoral	100.0%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	0.0%	83.3%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	45.5%	63.6%	27.3%	27.3%	0.0%	9.1%	9.1%
	All Inst.	64.7%	76.5%	47.1%	52.9%	0.0%	35.3%	5.9%
FL	Doctoral	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	66.7%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	66.7%	11.1%	11.1%	0.0%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	80.0%	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	85.7%	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	100.0%	40.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	90.5%	52.4%	23.8%	19.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%
	All Inst.	92.3%	50.0%	26.9%	23.1%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%
TX	Doctoral	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	50.0%	6.3%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	41.7%	8.3%	20.8%	8.3%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	80.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	71.4%	42.9%	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%

Table J. Personnel Strategies (State Imposed)

		Early Retirement	Salary Freeze	Vacancy & Hiring Freeze	None of the Previous	Layoffs	Salary Reduction	Contract Buyouts
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	63.6%	72.7%	54.5%	0.0%	9.1%	9.1%	0.0%
	All Inst.	41.2%	47.1%	35.3%	0.0%	5.9%	11.8%	0.0%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	55.6%	11.1%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	0.0%	40.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	80.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	95.2%	38.1%	19.0%	0.0%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	92.3%	38.5%	23.1%	0.0%	3.8%	0.0%	0.0%
TX	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	37.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	0.0%	6.3%	6.3%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	4.2%	12.5%	29.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table K. Faculty Retrenchment

		Nontenured	Tenured
DOCTORAL	None	58.3%	77.3%
	1% or less	20.8%	4.5%
	1.1-2%	8.3%	4.5%
	2.1-3%	0.0%	0.0%
	3.1-4%	8.3%	4.5%
	4.1-5%	8.3%	0.0%
	More than 5%	8.3%	9.1%
		Nontenured	**Tenured**
NONDOCTORAL	None	55.9%	71.4%
	1% or less	55.9%	14.3%
	1.1-2%	6.8%	3.6%
	2.1-3%	5.1%	1.8%
	3.1-4%	1.7%	1.8%
	4.1-5%	5.1%	0.0%
	More than 5%	13.6%	7.1%
		Nontenured	**Tenured**
ALL INST.	None	56.6%	73.1%
	1% or less	14.5%	11.5%
	1.1-2%	7.2%	3.8%
	2.1-3%	3.6%	1.3%
	3.1-4%	3.6%	2.6%
	4.1-5%	3.6%	0.0%
	More than 5%	3.6%	7.7%

Table L. Faculty Retrenchment by State (Nontenured)

		None	1% or Less	1.1-2%	2.1-3%	3.1-4%	4.1-5%	More Than 5%
CA	Doctoral	40.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	Non-doctoral	27.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	63.6%
	All Inst.	31.3%	6.3%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	50.0%
FL	Doctoral	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%
	All Inst.	55.6%	22.2%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	11.1%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%
	All Inst.	83.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
NY	Doctoral	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	52.6%	31.6%	10.5%	5.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	54.2%	33.3%	8.3%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
TX	Doctoral	62.5%	12.5%	12.5%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	73.3%	0.0%	6.7%	6.7%	6.7%	6.7%	0.0%
	All Inst.	69.6%	4.3%	8.7%	4.3%	8.7%	4.3%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	50.0%	0.0%	25.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	60.0%	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table M. Faculty Retrenchment by State (Tenured)

		None	1% or Less	1.1-2%	2.1-3%	3.1-4%	4.1-5%	More Than 5%
CA	Doctoral	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	Non-doctoral	27.3%	36.4%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%	27.3%
	All Inst.	37.5%	25.0%	0.0%	6.3%	6.3%	0.0%	25.0%
FL	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	83.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	68.4%	10.5%	10.5%	0.0%	5.3%	0.0%	5.3%
	All Inst.	75.0%	8.3%	8.3%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	4.2%
TX	Doctoral	85.7%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	92.9%	7.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	90.5%	4.8%	4.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%

Table N. Productivity and Efficiency Actions (% of respondents)

		Increasing Class Sizes	Use of Technology	Increasing Ratio Part-time to Full-time Faculty	Increasing Faculty Teaching Load	Reducing Faculty in Low Enroll. Fields	Reducing Time-to-Degree	Retraining Faculty
CA	Doctoral	66.7%	50.0%	66.7%	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%
	Non-doctoral	90.9%	72.7%	72.7%	54.5%	72.7%	45.5%	36.4%
	All Inst.	82.4%	64.7%	70.6%	64.7%	52.9%	58.8%	29.4%
FL	Doctoral	66.7%	0.0%	33.3%	100.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	50.0%	33.3%	50.0%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	16.7%
	All Inst.	55.6%	22.2%	44.4%	77.8%	22.2%	55.6%	11.1%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	40.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	42.9%	28.6%	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	40.0%	100.0%	60.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	Non-doctoral	71.4%	47.6%	42.9%	47.6%	52.4%	14.3%	19.0%
	All Inst.	65.4%	57.7%	46.2%	46.2%	50.0%	11.5%	19.2%
TX	Doctoral	37.5%	62.5%	25.0%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%
	Non-doctoral	37.5%	50.0%	31.3%	18.8%	25.0%	0.0%	6.3%
	All Inst.	37.5%	54.2%	29.2%	20.8%	20.8%	8.3%	8.3%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	80.0%	60.0%	40.0%	60.0%	60.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	71.4%	57.1%	57.1%	28.6%	57.1%	57.1%	0.0%

Table O. Class/Section Reduction by State

		None	Less Than 2%	2.1-4%	4.1-6%	6.1-8%	8.1-10%	More Than 10%	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	0.0%	9.1%	9.1%	18.2%	0.0%	9.1%	45.5%	9.1%
	All Inst.	23.5%	17.6%	5.9%	11.8%	0.0%	5.9%	29.4%	5.9%
FL	Doctoral	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
	Non-doctoral	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
	All Inst.	44.4%	33.3%	22.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	44.4%
MA	Doctoral	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	57.1%	0.0%	0.0%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	40.0%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	Non-doctoral	19.0%	38.1%	4.8%	9.5%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	14.0%
	All Inst.	23.1%	34.6%	7.7%	7.7%	11.5%	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%
TX	Doctoral	75.0%	12.5%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	50.0%	18.8%	18.8%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%
	All Inst.	58.3%	16.7%	16.7%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.2%
WI	Doctoral	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	57.1%	28.6%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table P. Program Elimination
Institutional Areas Combined or Eliminated (% of respondents)

		Campus Central Administration	Departments	Student Affairs	Maintenance & Operations	Colleges, Schools, Faculties	Academic Support
CA	Doctoral	66.7%	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	81.8%	45.5%	54.5%	27.3%	36.4%	18.2%
	All Inst.	76.5%	41.2%	47.1%	23.5%	29.4%	11.8%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	16.7%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	50.0%
	All Inst.	11.1%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	33.3%
MA	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%
	Non-doctoral	40.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	42.9%	28.6%	28.6%	57.1%	28.6%	28.6%
NY	Doctoral	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	Non-doctoral	47.6%	52.4%	47.6%	38.1%	28.6%	23.8%
	All Inst.	42.3%	46.2%	42.3%	34.6%	26.9%	23.1%
TX	Doctoral	37.5%	12.5%	12.5%	37.5%	12.5%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	37.5%	18.8%	12.5%	25.0%	6.3%	6.3%
	All Inst.	37.5%	16.7%	12.5%	29.2%	8.3%	4.2%
WI	Doctoral	100.0%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%	50.0%	100.0%
	Non-doctoral	60.0%	20.0%	60.0%	40.0%	40.0%	40.0%
	All Inst.	71.4%	42.9%	57.1%	57.1%	42.9%	57.1%

Table Q. Privatization of Activities or Services (% of respondents indicating privatization)

CA	Doctoral	16.7%
	Nondoctoral	54.5%
	All Inst.	41.2%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	50.0%
	All Inst.	33.3%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	20.0%
	All Inst.	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	40.0%
	Nondoctoral	19.0%
	All Inst.	23.1%
TX	Doctoral	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	43.8%
	All Inst.	45.8%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%

Table R. Activities or Services Privatized (% of respondents indicating privatization)

		Academic Support Services	Student Services	Administrative Services	Maintenance & Operations
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	18.2%	9.1%	36.4%	36.4%
	All Inst.	11.8%	5.9%	29.4%	23.5%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	33.3%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	22.2%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	9.5%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	3.8%	7.7%
TX	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	25.0%
	Nondoctoral	6.3%	12.5%	0.0%	6.3%
	All Inst.	4.2%	8.3%	4.2%	12.5%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table S. Mission Revision

		Mission Changes	Mission Did Not Change
CA	Doctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	Nondoctoral	18.20%	81.80%
	All Inst.	11.80%	88.20%
FL	Doctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	Nondoctoral	16.70%	83.30%
	All Inst.	11.10%	88.90%
MA	Doctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	Nondoctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	All Inst.	0.00%	100.00%
NY	Doctoral	20.00%	80.00%
	Nondoctoral	9.50%	90.50%
	All Inst.	11.50%	88.50%
TX	Doctoral	25.00%	75.00%
	Nondoctoral	25.00%	75.00%
	All Inst.	25.00%	75.00%
WI	Doctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	Nondoctoral	40.00%	60.00%
	All Inst.	28.60%	71.40%

Table T. Student Outcome Assessment

		Extensive	Limited	Not at All	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%
	Nondoctoral	9.1%	81.8%	0.0%	9.1%
	All Inst.	5.9%	64.7%	11.8%	17.6%
FL	Doctoral	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%
	All Inst.	22.2%	66.7%	11.1%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	20.0%	80.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	57.1%	0.0%	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	80.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	Nondoctoral	14.3%	76.2%	9.5%	0.0%
	All Inst.	11.5%	76.9%	7.7%	3.8%
TX	Doctoral	25.0%	62.5%	0.0%	12.5%
	Nondoctoral	50.0%	43.8%	0.0%	6.3%
	All Inst.	41.7%	50.0%	0.0%	8.3%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	57.1%	0.0%	14.3%

Table U. Best Practices

		Extensive	Limited	Not at All	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	16.7%
	Nondoctoral	9.1%	54.5%	18.2%	18.2%
	All Inst.	11.8%	41.2%	29.4%	17.6%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%
	Nondoctoral	4.8%	57.1%	28.6%	9.5%
	All Inst.	3.8%	53.8%	26.9%	15.4%
TX	Doctoral	12.5%	12.5%	37.5%	37.5%
	Nondoctoral	18.8%	62.5%	0.0%	18.8%
	All Inst.	16.7%	45.8%	12.5%	25.0%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%

Table V. Total Quality Management

		Extensive	Limited	Not at All	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	9.1%	81.8%	9.1%	0.0%
	All Inst.	11.8%	76.5%	11.8%	0.0%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	16.7%	83.3%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	11.1%	88.9%	0.0%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	57.1%	42.9%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	Nondoctoral	19.0%	57.1%	23.8%	0.0%
	All Inst.	19.2%	53.8%	23.1%	3.8%
TX	Doctoral	37.5%	50.0%	12.5%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	12.5%	68.8%	6.3%	12.5%
	All Inst.	20.8%	62.5%	8.3%	8.3%
WI	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	20.0%	60.0%	20.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	57.1%	14.3%	0.0%

Table W. Percent Redesigning Curriculum

		Undergraduate Curriculum Redesigned	Undergraduate Curriculum Not Redesigned
CA	Doctoral	16.70%	83.30%
	Nondoctoral	45.50%	54.50%
	All Inst.	35.30%	64.70%
FL	Doctoral	66.70%	33.30%
	Nondoctoral	66.70%	33.30%
	All Inst.	66.70%	33.30%
MA	Doctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	Nondoctoral	40.00%	60.00%
	All Inst.	28.60%	71.40%
NY	Doctoral	0.00%	100.00%
	Nondoctoral	38.10%	61.90%
	All Inst.	30.80%	69.20%
TX	Doctoral	12.50%	87.50%
	Nondoctoral	25.00%	75.00%
	All Inst.	20.80%	79.20%
WI	Doctoral	50.00%	50.00%
	Nondoctoral	80.00%	20.00%
	All Inst.	71.40%	28.60%

Table X. Changes in Enrollment Strategies

		Increase Enrollment	Decrease Enrollment	First-time Students to College	Increase Enrollment Transfers	Increase Out-of-State Enrollments	Increase In-State Enrollment
CA	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	20.0%	80.0%	10.0%	20.0%	20.0%	10.0%
	All Inst.	25.0%	75.0%	8.3%	16.7%	16.7%	8.3%
FL	Doctoral	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	100.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	81.8%	18.2%	0.0%	35.7%	21.4%	28.6%
	All Inst.	69.2%	30.8%	0.0%	31.3%	18.8%	25.0%
TX	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Non-doctoral	80.0%	20.0%	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%
	All Inst.	83.3%	16.7%	12.5%	37.5%	12.5%	25.0%
WI	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%
	All Inst.	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	20.0%

Table Y. Budget Stringency Strategy

		Restr. Exp.	Restr. Org. & Op.	Raising Revenue	Enroll-ment	Degree Req. & Curric.	Teaching & Learning Process	Campus Mission
CA	Doctoral	83.3%	83.3%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	90.9%	36.4%	54.5%	72.7%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%
	All Inst.	88.2%	52.9%	52.9%	52.9%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%
FL	Doctoral	66.7%	66.7%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	100.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	88.9%	66.7%	33.3%	11.1%	33.3%	11.1%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	50.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	40.0%	60.0%	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	42.9%	71.4%	71.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
NY	Doctoral	100.0%	100.0%	80.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	66.7%	81.0%	38.1%	23.8%	14.3%	9.5%	0.0%
	All Inst.	73.1%	84.6%	46.2%	23.1%	11.5%	7.7%	0.0%
TX	Doctoral	62.5%	62.5%	87.5%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	37.5%	50.0%	31.3%	43.8%	6.3%	18.8%	0.0%
	All Inst.	45.8%	54.2%	50.0%	37.5%	4.2%	12.5%	0.0%
WI	Doctoral	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Non-doctoral	40.0%	80.0%	20.0%	80.0%	20.0%	0.0%	20.0%
	All Inst.	57.1%	57.1%	42.9%	71.4%	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%

Table Z1. Quality of Undergraduate Education

		Increased	Decreased	Maintained	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	45.5%	54.5%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	47.1%	47.1%	5.9%
FL	Doctoral	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	11.1%	33.3%	55.6%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	20.0%	80.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	28.6%	57.1%	14.3%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	40.0%	40.0%	20.0%
	Nondoctoral	9.5%	38.1%	52.4%	0.0%
	All Inst.	7.7%	38.5%	50.0%	3.8%
TX	Doctoral	25.0%	12.5%	50.0%	12.5%
	Nondoctoral	31.3%	12.5%	50.0%	6.3%
	All Inst.	29.2%	12.5%	50.0%	8.3%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Nondoctoral	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%

Table Z2. Access to Undergraduate Education

		Increased	Decreased	Maintained	Did Not Answer
CA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	72.7%	27.3%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	64.7%	29.4%	5.9%
FL	Doctoral	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%
	All Inst.	33.3%	55.6%	11.1%	0.0%
MA	Doctoral	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	20.0%	80.0%	80.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	28.6%	57.1%	57.1%
NY	Doctoral	0.0%	60.0%	20.0%	20.0%
	Nondoctoral	0.0%	47.6%	52.4%	0.0%
	All Inst.	0.0%	50.0%	46.2%	3.8%
TX	Doctoral	12.5%	12.5%	62.5%	12.5%
	Nondoctoral	31.3%	18.8%	43.8%	6.3%
	All Inst.	25.0%	16.7%	50.0%	8.3%
WI	Doctoral	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Nondoctoral	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%
	All Inst.	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%	28.6%

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